Facebook, the JOBS Act, and Abolishing IPOs by Pritchard, Adam C.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Law & Economics Working Papers 
10-16-2012 
Facebook, the JOBS Act, and Abolishing IPOs 
Adam C. Pritchard 
University of Michigan Law School, acplaw@umich.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Securities 
Law Commons 
Working Paper Citation 
Pritchard, Adam C., "Facebook, the JOBS Act, and Abolishing IPOs" (2012). Law & Economics Working 
Papers. 56. 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/56 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2155036
12 | Regulation | Fall 2012
I
nitial public offerings (IPOs)—the first sale of private firms’ 
stock to the public—are a bellwether of investor sentiment. 
Investors must be bullish if they are putting their money into 
untested start-ups. IPOs are frequently cited in the business 
press as a key barometer of the health of financial markets. 
Politicians, too, see a steady flow of IPOs as an indicator that 
capital is fueling the entrepreneurial initiative that sustains the 
growth of new businesses. Growing businesses create jobs, so 
Republicans and Democrats can find common ground on the 
importance of promoting IPOs. That bipartisan consensus was 
on display this spring as Congress passed the JOBS Act (short-
hand for “Jump-start Our Business Start-ups Act”). The JOBS Act 
relaxes a number of regulatory requirements viewed as stumbling 
blocks for private companies considering IPOs. President Obama, 
anxious in an election year to be seen as pro-growth, quickly 
signed the bill into law, notwithstanding the opposition of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Investor sentiment can be a fickle thing, however, and the mar-
ket for IPOs is notorious for its swings from peaks to valleys. That 
fickleness was on display with the reaction to Facebook’s May 
2012 IPO. That deal went from being the most anticipated since 
Google’s IPO in 2004, to being a cautionary tale for investors. 
Facebook’s offering price was $38 per share, but its stock price 
quickly plunged in secondary market trading. Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
promptly filed a flurry of lawsuits. An IPO drought followed as 
companies were reluctant to take the plunge while investors were 
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still smarting from their Facebook losses. Congress called hear-
ings to examine the IPO process. 
Is there something fundamentally wrong with IPOs, or was 
Facebook an aberration? 
Initial Public Offerings: Bad Deals
Unfortunately, the Facebook debacle was just a salient example 
of an inefficient process. Speculation and irrational exuberance, 
fueled by Wall Street marketing and media attention, grease the 
wheels for deals that have little to recommend them. Unsur-
prisingly, the market for IPOs falls far short of the economists’ 
ideal of an efficient capital market. 
underpricing | Notwithstanding Facebook’s disappointing 
secondary market performance, the more common problem 
with IPOs is underpricing. Underpricing is the tendency for the 
price of IPO stocks to rise significantly above the offering price 
on the first day of secondary market trading. From the perspec-
tive of the issuer, the gap between the secondary market price 
and the offering price reflects unexploited market demand for 
the company’s shares—and untapped money that could help 
satisfy the company’s capital needs. Why would issuers leave 
this money on the table?
Although economists have put forward a variety of theories to 
explain underpricing, the most plausible explanation is that the 
run-up reflects a speculative frenzy among retail investors who 
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speculation helps explain why traditional “book-built” offerings, 
in which underwriters solicit buy orders, continue to dominate 
auctions as a means of selling securities. Auctions, which are pro-
moted as not leaving money on the table, have failed to attract a 
market following. The Achilles heel of auctions is that they offer 
no way of excluding the “dumb money.” If retail investors are 
allowed to dominate pricing, institutional investors—wary of the 
“winner’s curse” (overpaying for the shares)—will avoid the offer-
ing. Underpricing is simply the by-product of the need to exclude 
the undesirables from the initial pricing process. 
However, book-built offerings merely move the “dumb money” 
into the secondary market. Once that happens, all bets are off. 
long-term underperformance | The influx of retail traders 
into the secondary market, fueled by speculative enthusiasm, 
also explains the trend of IPOs toward long-term underperfor-
mance. Investors would be better served buying an index fund 
than chasing the next big thing in an IPO. Retail investors 
tolerate market-lagging returns overall in exchange for the 
possibility that one of their purchases may turn out to be the 
next Apple or Microsoft. Secondary market prices are driven by 
a lottery mentality, at least in the near term, which is not likely 
to lead to accurate pricing of a company’s future cash flows.
Given the typical pattern of underpricing in IPOs, what explains 
Facebook’s steep secondary market plunge? A variety of factors were 
identified as the culprit, with the most straightforward being the 
company’s decision to issue 25 percent more shares than originally 
contemplated. That decision no doubt 
played a part in the unusually large 
allocation of shares to retail investors 
in the offering. Morgan Stanley, Face-
book’s underwriter, was faulted for its 
aggressive pricing of the stock. Nas-
daq, the exchange where Facebook 
listed its shares, had a technologi-
cal meltdown, causing a substantial 
number of orders to apparently dis-
appear into the ether on the first day 
of trading. Most damning, however, 
was the revelation that analysts at a 
number of banks, including Morgan 
Stanley, had lowered their earnings 
projections for Facebook based on 
difficulties the company had disclosed 
with making money off of users who 
accessed Facebook through mobile 
devices. Analysts’ revised estimates 
were shared with the banks’ institu-
tional clients, but not with retail inves-
tors. Those lowered projections fueled 
the institutional investors’ interest in 
flipping their shares to retail investors 
as quickly as possible after the IPO. 
Speculative frenzy was not sufficient 
to sustain the secondary market price in the face of that influx of 
supply. The broader lesson is that the secondary market price of IPO 
companies can be very unstable.
If IPOs are such bad deals, why do they persist? Under current 
regulations, IPOs are a practical necessity. The raison d’être of 
IPOs is that they provide an entrée to the big leagues of public 
company status. That entrée is fraught with inefficiency, however, 
stemming from the difficulty in correctly valuing an unknown 
company making its first public disclosures in its offering pro-
spectus. Without the benefit of a trading market to process the 
disclosure and develop a consensus valuation, mispricing in the 
public offering is inevitable. The bottom line is that IPOs are a 
failure from the perspective of both capital formation and retail 
investor protection. 
So, is regulation to blame?
The Private/Public Line
Two Depression-era laws still provide the essential framework 
for securities regulation in the United States. The first enacted, 
the Securities Act of 1933, regulates public offerings of securi-
ties. The second, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, regulates 
secondary market trading of securities, including the disclo-
sure obligations of public companies to those markets. Despite 
having been enacted only a year apart, the two statutes draw the 
line between private and public in very different ways. 
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all comers. Accordingly, public offering regulations require not 
only extensive disclosure, but limit voluntary disclosure through a 
byzantine array of “gun-jumping” rules intended to curb specula-
tive frenzies for newly issued securities. Private offerings, on the 
other hand, are exempted from registration with the SEC and the 
gun-jumping rules, but those offerings are restricted to investors 
who can “fend for themselves” and therefore do not need the 
protections afforded by registration and mandatory disclosure. 
The SEC has adopted the presumption that accredited investors, 
which include individuals with $200,000 in annual income or 
$1 million in assets, are deemed to have the requisite investment 
sophistication. Because they are limited to sophisticated investors, 
private offerings are subject to considerably less onerous disclosure 
requirements than public offerings. Market demands, however, 
dictate that some disclosure, comparable to the SEC’s disclosure 
mandates, will be forthcoming even in private offerings. 
The Exchange Act has a very different public/private dividing 
line. Under the Exchange Act, until recently, companies become 
public when they: 
■■ listed their shares for trading on a securities exchange; 
■■ made a registered public offering; or 
■■ exceeded 500 record shareholders. 
Companies typically trigger public company status through 
an initial offering of shares, with a simultaneous listing of those 
shares on an exchange. Companies opted for public company 
status when they needed capital in amounts that could only be 
provided by the public markets, but the decision to make an IPO 
frequently comes when the company is pushing the 500-share-
holder limit. The problem arises because of prior private issues 
to employees and early-round investors. 
Notably absent from these criteria for public company status 
under the Exchange Act was any consideration of the character of 
the investors. Sophisticated institutions and small retail investors 
were treated alike for purposes of the tally to 500. Issuers could not 
avoid triggering public company status by limiting their investor 
base to accredited investors. Unlike the Securities Act, which allows 
companies to sell to accredited investors in private offerings, under 
the Exchange Act a company had no choice but to comply with 
periodic disclosure requirements once it passed 500 shareholders, 
regardless of the sophistication of those investors. 
This disconnect between the private/public standards under 
the two securities laws causes headaches for companies making 
the transition to public status, as I explain below. Facebook once 
again provides the illustration.
Facebook’s Path From Private To Public 
Facebook’s path from private to public company was a rocky 
one. In late 2010, Goldman Sachs proposed selling a significant 
block of Facebook shares to institutional and other sophisti-
cated investors via a trust that would bundle their interests in 
a single investment vehicle. The transaction drew attention 
because Facebook was at that time a private company and 
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planning to maintain that status, at least in the short term. The 
bundling was an unusual feature, designed to preserve Face-
book’s private status by keeping the number of record Face-
book investors under 500. Goldman appeared to be exploiting 
a loophole in the Exchange Act’s 500-shareholder limit. 
Whether Goldman’s strategy was viable is open to debate. 
The SEC’s rules allow shares held of record by a legal entity to be 
counted as one person. Thus, if broker-dealers held the shares as 
nominees for their customers, companies could have thousands 
of beneficial owners while their record books showed a number 
that remained under 500. The rule stipulates, however, that “[i]f 
the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of holding 
securities of record is used primarily to circumvent” the filing 
requirement, “the beneficial owners of such securities shall be 
deemed to be the record owners thereof.” That proviso suggests 
that the SEC would look through the legal entity to the actual 
owners if the issuer knows that the entity is being used to avoid 
public company filing. 
The proposed transaction attracted considerable media atten-
tion, which led to the offering’s eventual demise. The deal was 
pulled because of concerns that the media attention could be 
deemed to be a “general solicitation,” which would cause the offer 
to become “public” and require registration. Goldman instead 
placed the shares in an offshore transaction.
Facebook’s interaction with the private/public divide was also 
featured in another story that surfaced at around the same time. 
Word leaked that the SEC was investigating secondary trading 
markets for violations relating to the resale of securities issued by 
private companies. Facebook was among the more notable com-
panies traded on one of these venues, SecondMarket. These mar-
kets cater mainly to employees (both current and former) of pri-
vate companies, but also some early-round investors. They have 
experienced strong growth in recent years, but that growth was 
threatened by the SEC’s investigation. The SEC later announced 
that it had reached a settlement of an enforcement action with 
SharesPost, SecondMarket’s chief rival in this sector. The agency’s 
complaint in that action alleged that the trading venue had been 
operating as an unlicensed broker-dealer, a regulatory violation.
The SEC’s investigation casts a shadow over the future of 
private markets. In addition, these private markets, as currently 
structured, face substantial limits on their trading volume. Second-
Market and similar venues do not provide the liquidity afforded 
by an exchange, as they lack specialists and market makers, but 
instead simply match buyers and sellers in a central (virtual) loca-
tion. These trading venues are limited to accredited investors, and 
the venues screen prospective investors to ensure that they qualify 
as accredited. These precautions help to ensure that the shares are 
not being “distributed” to the public, which could render the trad-
ing venue an underwriter for purposes of the Securities Act. The 
Exchange Act’s numerical shareholder limit for private companies 
also poses an obstacle to further growth of these private markets. 
As a result, these trading venues are still dwarfed by the trading of 
public company shares on registered exchanges. Notwithstanding 
these limitations under current regulation, the growth of these 
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of accounting fees for newly public companies and reduces the 
audited financial statement requirement for IPOs to only two 
years. Post-IPO companies also are exempted from Section 404 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires auditor assessment 
of a company’s internal controls, for five years. That exemption 
disappears, however, after the company reaches $1 billion in 
annual revenue. Nonetheless, companies that go public should 
see substantially reduced auditors’ fees, at least in the short run.
Junior-varsity public companies? | For companies still unwill-
ing to face the burdens of full public company status, Congress 
gave the SEC new authority to exempt offerings from the ordi-
nary registration requirements, raising the limit for such offer-
ings from $5 million to $50 million. Along with that exemptive 
authority, Congress authorized the SEC to adopt less demand-
ing periodic disclosure from companies using this new offering 
exemption. Moreover, Congress also stipulated that the securi-
ties sold pursuant to this exemption be unrestricted, i.e., they 
could be freely resold to retail investors. 
This new exemption has the potential to be a game changer, cre-
ating a potential lower tier of public companies, thus blurring the 
line between public and private. However, the creation of a public 
company incubation pool is only a possibility, as it is easy to see the 
SEC dragging its heels in implementing this exemption. Certainly 
nothing will happen at the SEC anytime soon. The agency is still 
struggling to get out from under a rulemaking backlog created by 
the Dodd-Frank Act passed in 2010. After the 2012 election, with 
the spotlight from Capitol Hill perhaps less glaring, the SEC may 
feel that it has a freer hand in imposing substantial requirements 
when it eventually promulgates the exemption. The SEC may 
strangle the JOBS Act offering exemption in its crib.
Abolishing IPOs
The public/private dividing line is on shaky ground. With the 
JOBS Act, Congress has pushed back the public line for both 
the Securities Act (by eliminating the general solicitation ban 
for private offerings) and the Exchange Act (by raising the 
number of shareholders triggering public company status). But 
the JOBS Act fails to address the fundamental inefficiency of 
the market for IPOs. 
In this section, I propose an alternative to IPOs—the current 
transition point between private and public—that deals with that 
inefficiency. The foundation of my proposal rests on two central 
premises: 
■■ IPOs are an inefficient means of capital formation.
■■ Private markets, if freed up to continue expanding their 
pools of liquidity, can satisfy the capital needs of growing 
companies until they are ready for the burdens of being a 
public company. 
Under my proposal, companies would go up—and down—
between the private and public markets as warranted. Any com-
pany reaching a certain quantitative benchmark would be eligible 
venues suggests clear potential for expansion, if the regulatory 
scheme would accommodate it. 
The JOBS Act
Lawmakers in Congress seized upon the salient occasion of 
Goldman’s failed private offering of Facebook shares to attack 
the SEC for placing obstacles in the path of capital forma-
tion. The SEC responded in time-worn fashion, promising a 
review of its regulations to assess their effect on the U.S. capital 
markets. The SEC’s delaying tactic did not work, however, as a 
Republican House of Representatives, anxious for an election 
year edge, pushed forward with the bill that would ultimately 
become the JOBS Act.
the private/public line | How does the JOBS Act affect the 
dividing line between private and public? To begin, the act makes 
it easier for companies to raise capital while remaining private. 
It frees up the private placement process by permitting general 
solicitations, as long as sales are made only to accredited inves-
tors. The law also tinkers with the public company framework by 
raising the shareholder number to 2,000 (though no more than 
500 can be non-accredited) and excluding employees from the 
tally. These changes should delay the point at which a growing 
company would be forced to become public. 
These provisions might seem like a direct shot across the 
SEC’s bow, moving the line between public and private markets 
so as to afford private markets more space. For the SEC, which 
wraps itself in the mantle of “the investor’s advocate,” preserva-
tion of public markets—populated by a sizable contingent of 
retail investors (i.e., voters)—is an existential task. The agency’s 
political support is inextricably connected to its regulation of 
public markets. If the public markets ceased to exist, Congress 
would have little interest in funding the agency. 
From another perspective, however, the JOBS Act is far from 
revolutionary. Congress raised the number of investors for 
triggering public company status under the Exchange Act, but 
did not challenge the notion that there should be a numerical 
dividing line between public and private. The JOBS Act reflects a 
policy disagreement between the SEC and Congress over where 
that line should be drawn, but it leaves intact the basic regulatory 
architecture of the securities markets. 
Promoting iPos | Another key goal of the JOBS Act is to jump-
start the market for IPOs. The act loosens the gun-jumping 
rules by authorizing issuers to “test the waters” with institu-
tional buyers and accredited investors prior to filing a registra-
tion statement. Companies can assess whether there is demand 
for the company’s shares, allowing them to avoid the expense 
of registration if interest is lacking. In addition, the law frees 
securities analysts to issue research reports for new issuers 
during the offering process, thereby promoting demand for 
the company’s shares.
The JOBS Act also encourages IPOs by easing the burden 
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for elevation to the public market. If a company opted for public 
status, it would have to satisfy the periodic reporting obligations 
of the Exchange Act for as long as it remained public. I explain 
below how the process might work.
the private market | Issuers below the quantitative bench-
mark would be limited in their access to both the primary and 
secondary markets. Their securities could be sold in private 
offerings only to accredited investors. In contrast to current 
practice, however, those securities could not be freely resold 
after a minimum holding period. Instead, the issuer would be 
required to limit transfer of those shares to accredited investors 
until it became a public company. Accredited investors could 
freely resell the securities amongst themselves. 
I anticipate organized markets for private trading along the 
lines of SecondMarket and SharesPost. These private markets 
would need the issuer’s consent for the trading of their shares, a 
form of quasi-listing. Only certified accredited investors would 
be allowed to participate. The private trading market would be 
responsible for screening prospective investors to ensure that 
they meet the SEC’s criteria. This accredited investor category 
includes mutual funds, so retail investors could access exposure 
to this private market, albeit only through a diversified vehicle 
administered by a regulated investment manager.
The question of disclosure in the private market poses a chal-
lenging issue. It would defeat the market’s purpose to require the 
disclosure expected of a public company. On the other hand, some 
standardization of disclosure practices would likely benefit both 
investors and issuers. And the size of today’s private offerings raises 
the possibility of a collective action problem for investors, making 
it difficult for them to negotiate with the issuer for contractual 
representations and warranties. There are some fundamentals 
hard to imagine doing without, such as audited financial state-
ments. Beyond that baseline, however, are a range of difficult 
questions regarding materiality. One possibility would be to allow 
private markets to establish disclosure requirements pursuant to 
their listing agreements, with those listing agreements subject to 
SEC approval. Such an arrangement would afford flexibility and 
responsiveness to market forces, while still giving the SEC author-
ity to ensure that disclosure standards did not fall too far. 
the public market | Elevation to the public market would be 
voluntary in my scheme. Issuers that were not prepared to 
handle the burden of public company obligations could limit 
the transfer of their shares to the private market. If a company 
felt that it could satisfy its capital needs in the private market, 
it would be free to remain there.
Companies would graduate to the public market based on the 
value of their common equity. One possible benchmark would 
be $75 million in market capitalization, a threshold currently 
used by the SEC for streamlined “shelf” registration. A company 
electing to move to the public market would initiate the process 
by filing a Form 10-K (annual report) with the SEC. Its shares 
would then continue to trade in the private market for a season-
ing period with the filing of requisite 10-Qs (quarterly reports). 
The prices in the private market would now be informed by full 
SEC-mandated disclosure. After the seasoning period, accredited 
investors would be able to sell their shares in the public market. 
This opportunity would be available whether the accredited 
investor had purchased their shares from the company or from 
other accredited investors in the private trading market. That 
public market could be an exchange if the company chose to list, 
or the over-the-counter market. Either way, the trading price in 
the public market would be informed by the prior trading in the 
private market, as well as the new information released in the 
company’s 10-K and 10-Qs. 
There are some questions concerning the private market sea-
soning period before public trading would be permitted. It would 
not be practicable to limit companies from any sales during the 
seasoning period; capital needs do not go away simply because the 
company is making the transition to public status. Indeed, the need 
for capital is presumably pushing the company to bear the burdens 
of public status. This creates the risk that companies could use 
investment banks or other intermediaries, such as hedge funds, 
as conduits during the seasoning period. This strategy is limited, 
however, by the fact that the intermediaries could only sell the 
shares to other accredited investors during the seasoning period, 
thereby limiting the chance that the shares would be dumped on 
retail investors. Moreover, unless the company has very pressing 
capital needs, it is unlikely to accept much of a liquidity discount 
for its shares, which it will be able to freely sell after the seasoning 
period expires. It might be necessary, however, to impose volume 
limits on sellers in the public markets during a post-seasoning 
transition period to allow the trading market to develop. A quick 
dump of shares immediately after the seasoning period expired 
has the potential to reproduce the inefficient pricing and irrational 
speculation that taints the current market for IPOs.
Only after the company graduated to having its shares traded 
in the public secondary market would the company be allowed 
to sell securities to public investors. What form should sales of 
public equity by the issuer take? The logic of my proposal, with 
its preference for the superior informational efficiency of trading 
markets, suggests that issuers selling equity should be limited to 
at-the-market (ATM) offerings. Issuers would sell directly into 
the public trading market instead of relying on an underwriter to 
identify (create?) demand. This approach puts its faith in markets, 
rather than salesmen, for efficient pricing. 
Unfortunately, this strategy has its limits. ATM offerings 
are a rapidly growing portion of seasoned equity offerings, but 
their volume is still dwarfed by traditional book-built offerings. 
Particularly for larger offerings, the liquidity of the secondary 
trading market may be insufficient to absorb the newly issued 
shares. Indeed, even book-built offerings would be substantially 
constrained by the existence of a market price. Could we nudge 
issuers toward ATM offerings without mandating them?
One possibility would be to eliminate the Securities Act’s strict 
liability standards for ATM offerings, while retaining it for under-
written offerings. At a minimum, it makes little sense to impose 
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underwriter liability on the broker-dealers hired by issuers to 
manage ATM offerings. If large volumes need to be “sold, not 
bought,” the opportunities for abuse come in the selling process, 
and ATM offerings are not “sold.” The SEC’s enforcement efforts 
would be needed to ensure that there were no backdoor selling 
efforts to prime the market for an ATM offering. Even for the 
issuer, the draconian threat of the Securities Act’s strict liability 
seems excessive for an ATM offering. ATM offerings—if genuinely 
issued into a pre-existing market without solicitation—do not 
really require a registration statement or a prospectus; at most 
they need to file an 8-K with the SEC announcing the number 
of shares to be offered, followed by another 8-K disclosing the 
number actually sold. Anti-fraud concerns could be addressed 
by the Exchange Act’s less draconian Rule 10b-5. 
Relegation | If there are private companies wanting to rise to 
the public level, it follows that there will be public companies 
anxious to shed the burdens of public status. An important 
benefit of a two-tier market is that retail investors would not 
be cut off completely from liquidity if a company chooses 
to relegate itself to the private market. There is no reason to 
preclude retail investors from selling their shares in the private 
market, even if they would be barred from purchasing shares 
in companies that dropped to private status. Moreover, there 
is little to be gained by prohibiting companies from exiting 
the public pool; a restrictive approach will simply discourage 
companies from pursuing public company status in the first 
place. On the other hand, too easy an exit may invite abuses. 
To check manipulative schemes, I would mandate a share-
holder vote with the usual required disclosures before a company 
would be permitted to drop from public to private status. A vote 
would not trap companies that have struggled after going public, 
but it would require the company to persuade its shareholders 
that the benefits of public company status were no longer worth 
the candle. 
objections | Would an expanded private market open the door 
to fraud and manipulation? The short answer is that as long 
as people are infected by the love of money, fraud will always 
be with us. Given that sad fact of human nature, we should 
funnel transactions to the venues that make it most difficult 
to get away with fraud, and trading markets provide a critical 
check against fraud. To be sure, the private market proposed 
here is likely to have a higher incidence of fraud and manipula-
tion than the public market. But the scope of that fraud will 
necessarily be limited by the smaller size of the private markets 
relative to their public counterparts. Moreover, the entities 
sponsoring trading in those private markets will have com-
petitive incentives to take cost-effective measures to discourage 
fraud; discouraging fraud will encourage investor participation. 
SEC enforcement would remain available to counter the most 
egregious abuses. 
The potential for abuse in the private market has to be weighed 
against reductions in fraud elsewhere. In particular, my seasoning 
period requirement substantially reduces the opportunities for 
fraud by companies entering the public market. On balance, the 
overall incidence of fraud may be less. And retail investors, who 
are least able to bear it, will almost certainly be exposed to less 
fraud. At the same time, capital formation—efficient allocation 
of capital to cost-justified projects—will be enhanced. 
Conclusion
The conspicuous flaws with IPOs suggest that we should put an 
end to them, if we can establish a viable alternative. In my view, 
restrictions on private markets have hindered that viable alter-
native from emerging until now. In particular, private markets 
such as SecondMarket and SharesPost have been hamstrung 
by the 500-shareholder limit triggering public company status. 
The JOBS Act’s increase to 2,000 shareholders for public com-
pany status promises to bolster the liquidity of private markets, 
making them a robust alternative for growing companies.
This newly available liquidity is the lynchpin of my argument 
that we should replace IPOs with a two-tier market system. Issu-
ers choosing to make the transition to the public market would 
be required to file periodic disclosures with the SEC for an 
appropriate seasoning period, which would replace the IPO as 
the rite of passage to becoming a public company. Only after the 
seasoning period would the issuer be allowed to sell shares to the 
public at large. Such a regime would allow the secondary market 
to process an aspiring public company’s disclosure prior to any 
sales to the public and allow investors to arrive at a well-informed 
consensus valuation. This regulatory framework would go a long 
way toward promoting efficient capital formation and curtailing 
speculation. A happy by-product would be more vigorous inves-
tor protection for unsophisticated investors. Does anyone think 
that retail investors would be harmed if we eliminated IPOs? 
With the passage of the JOBS Act, change is coming to 
the demarcation between private and public status under the 
securities laws. Will the SEC attempt to obstruct this change, or 
embrace it in an effort to promote greater capital formation? 
My proposal affords the SEC an opportunity to promote capital 
formation while also enhancing investor protection. The two-tier 
private/public market scheme outlined here would harness pri-
vate markets to promote the public good while simultaneously 
eliminating the public bad of initial public offerings. 
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